Tech # Semiconductor Outlook: 2026–2035 Themes, Cycles, and Strategic Implications #…
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# Semiconductor Outlook: 2026–2035 Themes, Cycles, and Strategic Implications
# 반도체 전망: 2026–2035 핵심 테마, 사이클, 전략적 함의
---
## English
### 1) Macro outlook: strong growth, but narrower than it looks
The near-term semiconductor outlook is dominated by **AI-driven demand** (logic + memory), with a meaningful secondary recovery in other categories. The latest WSTS “Autumn 2025” forecast projects the global semiconductor market to **grow ~22% in 2025 (to ~$772B)** and then **grow by more than 25% in 2026 to ~$975B**, i.e., approaching **$1 trillion**. WSTS attributes the upgrade primarily to **Logic and Memory**, boosted by AI-related applications and continued data-center demand, with other categories improving more gradually.
What that implies in practice:
* **Winners are concentrated**: AI accelerators, networking silicon, HBM/DRAM, advanced packaging, and critical wafer-fab equipment.
* **“Broad semiconductor boom” is overstated**: WSTS itself flags weaker areas such as **automotive-related discretes** (still soft) even while AI is booming.
### 2) The demand engine: data centers + “AI everywhere,” but with a power constraint
**Data-center AI buildout** remains the primary growth lever, and it is increasingly constrained not only by chips but by **power and infrastructure**. Reuters and other reporting in late 2025 emphasized that AI-driven demand is pushing the supply chain (particularly memory and packaging) into scarcity dynamics. ([Reuters][1])
The demand stack splits into:
* **Training** (still massive, but increasingly optimized and platform-consolidated)
* **Inference** (rapidly expanding footprint; drives memory bandwidth/capacity needs at scale)
### 3) The real bottlenecks: HBM and advanced packaging (back-end becomes the choke point)
The “chip shortage” narrative has shifted from front-end wafer capacity alone to **HBM supply and advanced packaging capacity**.
**HBM / DRAM tightness**
* Reuters reported that **SK hynix said its chips were sold out for 2026**, while Samsung had secured customers for its HBM chips for the following year; both are expanding capacity, but **new conventional capacity** is not expected to come online until **2027–2028** in meaningful volume. ([Reuters][1])
* Reuters also noted Micron increasing **2026 capex to $20B**, with analysts expecting tightness to persist well into **2027**. ([Reuters][2])
* Shortages can propagate into consumer pricing: the Financial Times reported industry warnings about cost/price pressure into 2026 tied to HBM-driven scarcity. ([Financial Times][3])
**Advanced packaging (CoWoS, etc.)**
* Reuters has repeatedly highlighted that cutting-edge AI chips require advanced packaging (e.g., CoWoS), and that packaging capacity can be geographically concentrated (e.g., not necessarily co-located with new front-end fabs). ([Reuters][4])
* This is structurally important: even if wafer starts rise, system shipment volume can still be capped by packaging throughput.
### 4) Technology trajectory: nodes still matter, but “system scaling” matters more
The next decade’s performance gains increasingly come from **co-design across transistor + interconnect + packaging + memory**.
Key inflection points:
* **GAA at leading edge (2nm-class)**: industry reporting indicates TSMC began volume production of a 2nm-class node (N2) in **Q4 2025**, with planned follow-on variants and backside power concepts for HPC later. ([Tom's Hardware][5])
* **Chiplets + advanced packaging**: scaling is increasingly “package-first” (heterogeneous integration), where yield, thermals, and interconnect become as decisive as lithography.
* **Memory-on-package and bandwidth scaling**: HBM roadmaps, substrate availability, and interposer/organic alternatives become competitive differentiators.
### 5) Capacity and capex: the industry is spending through the cycle
Capex remains elevated, but it is being reallocated toward AI-relevant capacity:
* SEMI projects global semiconductor equipment sales rising to **$126B in 2026** and **$135B in 2027**, driven by logic and memory used for AI. ([Reuters][6])
* SEMI’s longer view indicates 300mm fab equipment spending surpassing **$100B in 2025** and increasing further through **2028**. ([SEMI][7])
* SEMI also expects memory equipment sales to keep rising in 2026–2027 as suppliers ramp HBM and migrate nodes. ([SEMI][8])
### 6) Mature nodes and “boring chips”: still essential, less explosive
Not everything is 2nm. Automotive, industrial, power management, sensors, and connectivity rely heavily on **mature-node 200mm/300mm** capacity.
* SEMI’s 200mm outlook shows spending dipping in 2025 then rebounding in 2026, with a longer-term trend that is flatter than leading-edge AI investment. ([SEMI][9])
Strategic implication: product companies that depend on mature-node parts still need **multi-sourcing, redesign flexibility, and inventory strategy**, even if headlines focus on AI GPUs.
### 7) Geopolitics and policy: fragmentation is now structural
Semiconductors are now treated as strategic infrastructure; policy and export controls are shaping where capacity is built and which customers can be served.
**U.S. export controls**
* BIS has continued tightening controls aimed at limiting China’s ability to obtain or produce advanced semiconductors, building on the October 2022 framework with updates in 2023–2024. ([산업안전청][10])
* A U.S. Congressional Research Service report describes the “AI Diffusion Rule” (January 15, 2025) as part of a global licensing framework to restrict access to advanced chips and AI computing power through third countries. ([의회.gov][11])
**China localization push**
* Reuters reported China implementing a rule requiring chipmakers to use **at least 50% domestic equipment** for new capacity, reinforcing a long-run self-sufficiency strategy. ([Reuters][12])
**Korea/Taiwan/Japan/Europe dynamics**
* Reuters reported the U.S. moving toward annual licensing for certain tool shipments to Samsung and SK hynix fabs in China for 2026, illustrating the operational friction created by controls. ([Reuters][13])
* The European Court of Auditors concluded the EU’s Chips Act gave impetus, but the investment level is **very unlikely** to achieve the EU’s ambitious 2030 target; it cites projections of the EU share at **~11.7% by 2030** versus the 20% goal. ([European Court of Auditors][14])
### 8) Key risks to the outlook (what can break the “AI-led supercycle”)
1. **Demand concentration risk**: hyperscaler capex and a small number of AI platforms dominate marginal demand. ([The Wall Street Journal][15])
2. **HBM + packaging bottlenecks**: shortages can persist even when front-end capacity grows. ([Reuters][1])
3. **Capex overshoot / memory cyclicality**: memory is structurally cyclical; tightness can flip to oversupply if demand assumptions miss. ([Reuters][2])
4. **Export-control shocks and compliance**: rule changes can re-route supply chains abruptly. ([산업안전청][10])
5. **IP leakage and talent security**: enforcement actions in late 2025 show how sensitive advanced DRAM knowledge is competitively. ([Reuters][16])
### 9) Practical takeaways (actionable “tips” that survive uncertainty)
* **Design for substitution**: use pin-/footprint-compatible alternates where possible; avoid single-sourced PMICs, MCUs, and connectivity parts.
* **Treat memory as a strategic component**: contract earlier, qualify second sources, and model BOM sensitivity to DRAM/HBM price swings. ([Reuters][1])
* **Assume packaging is capacity-constrained** for top-end accelerators: system delivery schedules can depend on back-end throughput, not wafer starts. ([Reuters][4])
* **Plan for regulatory variance** if your supply chain touches China/advanced compute: compliance and licensing timelines become part of lead-time planning. ([Reuters][13])
* **Track equipment-spend leading indicators**: equipment sales and 300mm spend forecasts are early signals of where the next capacity wave is headed. ([Reuters][6])
---
## 한국어
### 1) 거시 전망: “성장 확정”이지만, 수혜는 좁고 집중된다
2026년 전후 반도체 전망은 **AI가 주도하는 로직·메모리 수요**가 중심입니다. WSTS(Autumn 2025) 최신 전망은 **2025년 약 22% 성장(약 7,720억 달러)** 이후 **2026년에 25% 이상 성장해 약 9,750억 달러**로 **1조 달러에 근접**한다고 봅니다. 상향 조정의 핵심 원인은 **Logic·Memory의 강세(AI 수요)**이며, 나머지 품목군은 “완만한 회복” 쪽으로 표현되어 있습니다.
핵심 의미는 다음과 같습니다.
* **수혜는 AI 가치사슬에 집중**: AI 가속기·데이터센터 네트워킹·HBM/DRAM·첨단 패키징·핵심 장비/소재 쪽이 초과수익 구간입니다.
* “반도체 전반이 다 같이 호황”이라기보다 **섹터별 온도차**가 큽니다. WSTS도 자동차 약세가 남아 있는 영역(예: Discretes)을 별도로 언급합니다.
### 2) 수요의 엔진: 데이터센터 AI + 전 산업 ‘AI 내장화’, 그리고 전력/인프라 제약
AI 데이터센터 증설이 수요를 끌어올리지만, 병목은 칩만이 아니라 **전력·인프라·메모리·패키징**까지 확장되었습니다. 2025년 말 기준 다수 보도는 AI가 공급망을 다시 “타이트”하게 만들고 있음을 강조했습니다. ([Reuters][1])
수요 구조는 대체로:
* **훈련(Training)**: 대규모지만 플랫폼/설계 최적화가 빠르게 진행
* **추론(Inference)**: 적용처 확대로 폭발적인 확산, 특히 **메모리 대역폭·용량** 수요를 크게 자극
### 3) 진짜 병목: HBM(메모리) + 첨단 패키징(후공정이 ‘초크 포인트’)
최근 “칩 부족”의 핵심은 전공정 웨이퍼뿐 아니라 **HBM 공급과 첨단 패키징 처리량**입니다.
**HBM/DRAM 타이트**
* Reuters는 **SK hynix가 2026년 물량이 사실상 매진**됐다고 언급했고, 삼성도 다음 해 HBM 고객을 확보했다고 전했습니다. 다만 증설을 하더라도 **의미 있는 신규(특히 범용) 생산능력은 2027–2028년에나 본격화**될 수 있다는 맥락이 함께 제시됩니다. ([Reuters][1])
* Reuters는 Micron이 **2026년 Capex를 200억 달러로 상향**하며 수요 대응에 나섰고, 공급 타이트가 **2027년까지** 이어질 수 있다는 분석도 인용했습니다. ([Reuters][2])
* FT는 HBM 중심의 희소성이 소비자 제품 가격에도 압력을 줄 수 있다는 업계 경고를 보도했습니다. ([Financial Times][3])
**첨단 패키징(CoWoS 등)**
* Reuters는 AI 칩이 고급 패키징을 필수로 요구하며, 패키징 용량이 특정 지역에 집중될 수 있어(예: 신규 전공정 라인과 동행하지 않음) 시스템 출하가 제한될 수 있음을 반복적으로 다뤘습니다. ([Reuters][4])
### 4) 기술 전망: 공정 미세화는 계속되지만, ‘시스템 스케일링’이 더 중요해진다
향후 10년의 성능/전력 개선은 **트랜지스터 + 배선 + 패키징 + 메모리**를 묶은 시스템 최적화에서 더 크게 나옵니다.
주요 포인트:
* **GAA·2nm급 진입**: 업계 보도에 따르면 TSMC는 2nm급(N2) 양산을 **2025년 4분기**에 시작했으며, 후속 개선(파생 노드, backside power 개념 등)을 준비 중으로 언급됩니다. ([Tom's Hardware][5])
* **칩렛/3D 패키징**: 성능은 “칩 하나”가 아니라 **패키지 단위(이종 집적)**에서 좌우되는 비중이 급격히 커집니다.
* **HBM/메모리-온-패키지**: 대역폭, 열, 기판/인터포저, 조립 수율이 경쟁력 핵심이 됩니다.
### 5) 설비투자 전망: 사이클을 “AI 중심으로 재배치”하며 계속 간다
* SEMI는 반도체 제조장비 글로벌 매출이 **2026년 1,260억 달러**, **2027년 1,350억 달러** 수준으로 증가할 것으로 봤고, 동인을 AI용 로직·메모리 투자에서 찾습니다. ([Reuters][6])
* SEMI는 300mm 팹 장비 지출이 **2025년에 1,000억 달러를 돌파**하고 2028년까지 증가하는 흐름을 제시합니다. ([SEMI][7])
* 메모리 장비 지출도 HBM 확대 및 공정 전환으로 2026~2027년까지 증가 전망이 제시됩니다. ([SEMI][8])
### 6) 성숙공정(레거시) 전망: “폭발적 성장”은 아니지만, 산업의 필수 기반
자동차·산업·전력반도체·센서·각종 MCU/아날로그는 여전히 **성숙공정** 중심입니다.
* SEMI 200mm 전망은 2025년 일시 조정 후 2026년 반등을 제시하지만, 장기적으로는 최첨단 AI 투자보다 완만한 궤적입니다. ([SEMI][9])
### 7) 지정학/정책: 분절화는 ‘일시 현상’이 아니라 구조가 됐다
**미국 수출통제**
* BIS는 중국의 첨단 반도체 확보/생산 능력 제한을 위해 2022년 체계 이후 2023–2024년에도 규정을 강화해 왔음을 밝힙니다. ([산업안전청][10])
* 미 의회조사국(CRS)은 2025년 1월 15일 ‘AI Diffusion Rule’ 등을 통해 제3국 경유까지 포함한 라이선스 체계 구상을 설명합니다. ([의회.gov][11])
**중국의 국산화 압력**
* Reuters는 중국이 신규 팹에 **국산 장비 50% 이상**을 요구하는 규칙을 시행하고 있다고 보도했습니다. ([Reuters][12])
**유럽의 현실**
* 유럽감사원(ECA)은 EU Chips Act가 동력을 제공했지만, 현재 투자 수준으로는 2030년 목표 달성이 **매우 어렵다**고 결론 내리며, EU 점유율이 **2030년 11.7% 수준**으로 예측된다고 지적합니다. ([European Court of Auditors][14])
### 8) 전망을 흔들 수 있는 리스크(‘AI 슈퍼사이클’의 약점)
1. **수요 집중**: 초대형 클라우드/AI 플랫폼 소수에 수요가 편중. ([The Wall Street Journal][15])
2. **HBM·패키징 병목**: 전공정 증설만으로 해결되지 않는 구조적 제약. ([Reuters][1])
3. **메모리 사이클**: 타이트가 과잉투자로 급변할 가능성(수요 오판 시). ([Reuters][2])
4. **수출통제/규정 변경**: 라이선스·규정의 변화가 리드타임 자체를 바꿈. ([의회.gov][11])
5. **기술·인력·보안**: 첨단 공정/DRAM 지식 유출은 경쟁력을 단기간에 훼손. ([Reuters][16])
### 9) 실무 팁(추가 응용까지 포함)
* **대체 설계(Design-for-Substitution)**를 기본값으로 두고, 단일 공급 부품(PMIC/MCU/커넥티비티)을 줄여라.
* **메모리를 전략부품으로 관리**하라: 장기 계약·2nd source·가격 민감도(특히 DRAM/HBM)를 BOM 수준에서 상시 모델링하라. ([Reuters][1])
* 최첨단 AI 제품은 **패키징 처리량이 출하량을 결정**할 수 있다(웨이퍼가 있어도 못 나갈 수 있음). ([Reuters][4])
* 공급망이 중국/첨단 연산과 맞물리면 **규정 준수와 라이선스 리드타임**을 납기 계획에 포함하라. ([Reuters][13])
* 장비/300mm 지출 전망은 다음 증설 파동의 선행지표다. ([Reuters][6])
---
## 日本語
### 1) 全体像：成長は強いが、恩恵はAI周辺に集中
WSTSのAutumn 2025予測では、世界半導体市場は**2025年に約22%成長（約7,720億ドル）**、**2026年に25%以上成長して約9,750億ドル**と、1兆ドルに迫る見通しです。上方修正の主因は**LogicとMemory（AI需要）**で、その他は緩やかな回復とされています。
### 2) 主要ボトルネック：HBMと先端パッケージ
* Reutersは、SK hynixの2026年供給が極めてタイトであることや、増産しても新しい生産能力が本格化するのは**2027–2028年**になり得る文脈を報じています。 ([Reuters][1])
* Micronの2026年capex拡大（$20B）と、供給逼迫が2027年まで続く可能性も報じられました。 ([Reuters][2])
* 先端AIチップはCoWoS等の高度パッケージが不可欠で、パッケージ能力が出荷の上限になり得ます。 ([Reuters][4])
### 3) 技術トレンド：微細化＋“システム”最適化
2nm級（GAA等）の進展は重要ですが、今後の差は**チップレット、3D実装、HBM統合、熱設計、歩留まり**など、パッケージ単位の最適化で拡大します。 ([Tom's Hardware][5])
### 4) 地政学：分断は構造化
米国の輸出管理強化（BIS）や、CRSが説明するAI拡散ルールの枠組みは、供給・顧客・投資の意思決定を恒常的に左右します。 ([산업안전청][10])
EUについては欧州会計検査院が2030目標の達成困難性を指摘しています。 ([European Court of Auditors][14])
---
## Español
### 1) Panorama: expansión fuerte, impulsada por IA
WSTS (Autumn 2025) prevé **+22% en 2025 (~US$772B)** y **más de +25% en 2026 (~US$975B)**, acercándose a US$1T. La revisión al alza se atribuye principalmente a **lógica y memoria** por demanda de IA y centros de datos.
### 2) Cuellos de botella: HBM y empaquetado avanzado
Reuters describió un **endurecimiento de la oferta de memoria** ligado a HBM, con expansión de capacidad pero con nuevas plantas relevantes más hacia **2027–2028**; también informó del aumento de capex de Micron para 2026 y expectativas de tensión hasta 2027. ([Reuters][1])
Además, el empaquetado avanzado (p. ej., CoWoS) puede limitar los envíos de sistemas de IA incluso si hay capacidad front-end. ([Reuters][4])
### 3) Geopolítica: controles y reconfiguración industrial
BIS ha reforzado controles para restringir capacidades avanzadas, y CRS describe marcos para limitar la difusión vía terceros países. ([산업안전청][10])
En Europa, el Tribunal de Cuentas de la UE ve improbable alcanzar el objetivo 2030 con el nivel actual de inversión. ([European Court of Auditors][14])
---
## Français
### 1) Vue d’ensemble : croissance élevée, mais concentrée sur l’IA
WSTS (Autumn 2025) anticipe **~+22% en 2025 (≈772 Md$)** et **>+25% en 2026 (≈975 Md$)**, tirés surtout par **Logic et Memory** (IA, data centers), avec une reprise plus graduelle ailleurs.
### 2) Goulots d’étranglement : HBM et packaging avancé
Reuters décrit une tension d’offre sur la mémoire portée par l’HBM, avec des capacités supplémentaires qui prennent du temps à arriver (horizon 2027–2028 pour des volumes significatifs), et l’augmentation des investissements 2026 chez Micron avec une tension pouvant durer jusqu’en 2027. ([Reuters][1])
Le packaging avancé (CoWoS, etc.) devient un facteur limitant de livraisons des systèmes IA. ([Reuters][4])
### 3) Politique industrielle et contrôles : une fragmentation durable
Les contrôles BIS et les cadres décrits par CRS structurent désormais l’allocation de capacité et les routes d’approvisionnement. ([산업안전청][10])
La Cour des comptes européenne juge l’objectif 2030 très difficile à atteindre au vu des investissements actuels. ([European Court of Auditors][14])
---
* [The Wall Street Journal](https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/after-a-year-of-blistering-growth-ai-chip-makers-get-ready-for-bigger-2026-d9f62dbd?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/1f471189-2277-4d5d-822b-78eba6060755?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ai-boom-seen-lifting-chipmaking-equipment-sales-9-126-billion-2026-2025-12-16/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-mandates-50-domestic-equipment-rule-chipmakers-sources-say-2025-12-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/samsung-wins-us-annual-approval-chipmaking-tool-shipments-china-source-says-2025-12-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-charges-10-over-alleged-chip-technology-leak-chinas-cxmt-2025-12-26/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
[1]: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/ai-frenzy-is-driving-new-global-supply-chain-crisis-2025-12-03/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "The AI frenzy is driving a memory chip supply crisis"
[2]: https://www.reuters.com/business/micron-shares-up-12-europe-after-blowout-forecast-2025-12-18/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Micron surges as global memory chip shortage boosts ..."
[3]: https://www.ft.com/content/1f471189-2277-4d5d-822b-78eba6060755?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Chip shortages threaten 20% rise in consumer electronics prices"
[4]: https://www.reuters.com/technology/tsmc-talks-with-nvidia-ai-chip-production-arizona-sources-say-2024-12-05/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "TSMC in talks with Nvidia for AI chip production in Arizona, ..."
[5]: https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/semiconductors/tsmc-begins-quietly-volume-production-of-2nm-class-chips-first-gaa-transistor-for-tsmc-claims-up-to-15-percent-improvement-at-iso-power?utm_source=chatgpt.com "TSMC begins quietly volume production of 2nm-class chips - first GAA transistor for TSMC claims up to 15% improvement at ISO power"
[6]: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ai-boom-seen-lifting-chipmaking-equipment-sales-9-126-billion-2026-2025-12-16/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "AI boom seen lifting chipmaking equipment sales 9% to $126 billion in 2026"
[7]: https://www.semi.org/en/semi-press-release/semi-reports-global-300mm-fab-equipment-spending-expected-to-total-374-billion-dollars-over-next-three-years?utm_source=chatgpt.com "SEMI Reports Global 300mm Fab Equipment Spending ..."
[8]: https://www.semi.org/en/semi-press-release/global-semiconductor-equipment-sales-projected-to-reach-a-record-of-156-billion-dollars-in-2027-semi-reports?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Global Semiconductor Equipment Sales Projected to ..."
[9]: https://www.semi.org/en/products-services/market-data/200mm-fab-outlook?utm_source=chatgpt.com "200mm Fab Outlook Report"
[10]: https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-export-controls-restrict-chinas-capability-produce-advanced-semiconductors-military?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Commerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China's"
[11]: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48642?utm_source=chatgpt.com "U.S. Export Controls and China: Advanced Semiconductors"
[12]: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-mandates-50-domestic-equipment-rule-chipmakers-sources-say-2025-12-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "China mandates 50% domestic equipment rule for chipmakers, sources say"
[13]: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/samsung-wins-us-annual-approval-chipmaking-tool-shipments-china-source-says-2025-12-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "US approves Samsung, SK Hynix chipmaking tool shipments to China for 2026, sources say"
[14]: https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2025-12/SR-2025-12_EN.pdf "Special report 12/2025 - The EU’s strategy for microchips"
[15]: https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/after-a-year-of-blistering-growth-ai-chip-makers-get-ready-for-bigger-2026-d9f62dbd?utm_source=chatgpt.com "After a Year of Blistering Growth, AI Chip Makers Get Ready for Bigger 2026"
[16]: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-charges-10-over-alleged-chip-technology-leak-chinas-cxmt-2025-12-26/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "South Korea charges 10 over alleged chip technology leak to China's CXMT"
# 반도체 전망: 2026–2035 핵심 테마, 사이클, 전략적 함의
---
## English
### 1) Macro outlook: strong growth, but narrower than it looks
The near-term semiconductor outlook is dominated by **AI-driven demand** (logic + memory), with a meaningful secondary recovery in other categories. The latest WSTS “Autumn 2025” forecast projects the global semiconductor market to **grow ~22% in 2025 (to ~$772B)** and then **grow by more than 25% in 2026 to ~$975B**, i.e., approaching **$1 trillion**. WSTS attributes the upgrade primarily to **Logic and Memory**, boosted by AI-related applications and continued data-center demand, with other categories improving more gradually.
What that implies in practice:
* **Winners are concentrated**: AI accelerators, networking silicon, HBM/DRAM, advanced packaging, and critical wafer-fab equipment.
* **“Broad semiconductor boom” is overstated**: WSTS itself flags weaker areas such as **automotive-related discretes** (still soft) even while AI is booming.
### 2) The demand engine: data centers + “AI everywhere,” but with a power constraint
**Data-center AI buildout** remains the primary growth lever, and it is increasingly constrained not only by chips but by **power and infrastructure**. Reuters and other reporting in late 2025 emphasized that AI-driven demand is pushing the supply chain (particularly memory and packaging) into scarcity dynamics. ([Reuters][1])
The demand stack splits into:
* **Training** (still massive, but increasingly optimized and platform-consolidated)
* **Inference** (rapidly expanding footprint; drives memory bandwidth/capacity needs at scale)
### 3) The real bottlenecks: HBM and advanced packaging (back-end becomes the choke point)
The “chip shortage” narrative has shifted from front-end wafer capacity alone to **HBM supply and advanced packaging capacity**.
**HBM / DRAM tightness**
* Reuters reported that **SK hynix said its chips were sold out for 2026**, while Samsung had secured customers for its HBM chips for the following year; both are expanding capacity, but **new conventional capacity** is not expected to come online until **2027–2028** in meaningful volume. ([Reuters][1])
* Reuters also noted Micron increasing **2026 capex to $20B**, with analysts expecting tightness to persist well into **2027**. ([Reuters][2])
* Shortages can propagate into consumer pricing: the Financial Times reported industry warnings about cost/price pressure into 2026 tied to HBM-driven scarcity. ([Financial Times][3])
**Advanced packaging (CoWoS, etc.)**
* Reuters has repeatedly highlighted that cutting-edge AI chips require advanced packaging (e.g., CoWoS), and that packaging capacity can be geographically concentrated (e.g., not necessarily co-located with new front-end fabs). ([Reuters][4])
* This is structurally important: even if wafer starts rise, system shipment volume can still be capped by packaging throughput.
### 4) Technology trajectory: nodes still matter, but “system scaling” matters more
The next decade’s performance gains increasingly come from **co-design across transistor + interconnect + packaging + memory**.
Key inflection points:
* **GAA at leading edge (2nm-class)**: industry reporting indicates TSMC began volume production of a 2nm-class node (N2) in **Q4 2025**, with planned follow-on variants and backside power concepts for HPC later. ([Tom's Hardware][5])
* **Chiplets + advanced packaging**: scaling is increasingly “package-first” (heterogeneous integration), where yield, thermals, and interconnect become as decisive as lithography.
* **Memory-on-package and bandwidth scaling**: HBM roadmaps, substrate availability, and interposer/organic alternatives become competitive differentiators.
### 5) Capacity and capex: the industry is spending through the cycle
Capex remains elevated, but it is being reallocated toward AI-relevant capacity:
* SEMI projects global semiconductor equipment sales rising to **$126B in 2026** and **$135B in 2027**, driven by logic and memory used for AI. ([Reuters][6])
* SEMI’s longer view indicates 300mm fab equipment spending surpassing **$100B in 2025** and increasing further through **2028**. ([SEMI][7])
* SEMI also expects memory equipment sales to keep rising in 2026–2027 as suppliers ramp HBM and migrate nodes. ([SEMI][8])
### 6) Mature nodes and “boring chips”: still essential, less explosive
Not everything is 2nm. Automotive, industrial, power management, sensors, and connectivity rely heavily on **mature-node 200mm/300mm** capacity.
* SEMI’s 200mm outlook shows spending dipping in 2025 then rebounding in 2026, with a longer-term trend that is flatter than leading-edge AI investment. ([SEMI][9])
Strategic implication: product companies that depend on mature-node parts still need **multi-sourcing, redesign flexibility, and inventory strategy**, even if headlines focus on AI GPUs.
### 7) Geopolitics and policy: fragmentation is now structural
Semiconductors are now treated as strategic infrastructure; policy and export controls are shaping where capacity is built and which customers can be served.
**U.S. export controls**
* BIS has continued tightening controls aimed at limiting China’s ability to obtain or produce advanced semiconductors, building on the October 2022 framework with updates in 2023–2024. ([산업안전청][10])
* A U.S. Congressional Research Service report describes the “AI Diffusion Rule” (January 15, 2025) as part of a global licensing framework to restrict access to advanced chips and AI computing power through third countries. ([의회.gov][11])
**China localization push**
* Reuters reported China implementing a rule requiring chipmakers to use **at least 50% domestic equipment** for new capacity, reinforcing a long-run self-sufficiency strategy. ([Reuters][12])
**Korea/Taiwan/Japan/Europe dynamics**
* Reuters reported the U.S. moving toward annual licensing for certain tool shipments to Samsung and SK hynix fabs in China for 2026, illustrating the operational friction created by controls. ([Reuters][13])
* The European Court of Auditors concluded the EU’s Chips Act gave impetus, but the investment level is **very unlikely** to achieve the EU’s ambitious 2030 target; it cites projections of the EU share at **~11.7% by 2030** versus the 20% goal. ([European Court of Auditors][14])
### 8) Key risks to the outlook (what can break the “AI-led supercycle”)
1. **Demand concentration risk**: hyperscaler capex and a small number of AI platforms dominate marginal demand. ([The Wall Street Journal][15])
2. **HBM + packaging bottlenecks**: shortages can persist even when front-end capacity grows. ([Reuters][1])
3. **Capex overshoot / memory cyclicality**: memory is structurally cyclical; tightness can flip to oversupply if demand assumptions miss. ([Reuters][2])
4. **Export-control shocks and compliance**: rule changes can re-route supply chains abruptly. ([산업안전청][10])
5. **IP leakage and talent security**: enforcement actions in late 2025 show how sensitive advanced DRAM knowledge is competitively. ([Reuters][16])
### 9) Practical takeaways (actionable “tips” that survive uncertainty)
* **Design for substitution**: use pin-/footprint-compatible alternates where possible; avoid single-sourced PMICs, MCUs, and connectivity parts.
* **Treat memory as a strategic component**: contract earlier, qualify second sources, and model BOM sensitivity to DRAM/HBM price swings. ([Reuters][1])
* **Assume packaging is capacity-constrained** for top-end accelerators: system delivery schedules can depend on back-end throughput, not wafer starts. ([Reuters][4])
* **Plan for regulatory variance** if your supply chain touches China/advanced compute: compliance and licensing timelines become part of lead-time planning. ([Reuters][13])
* **Track equipment-spend leading indicators**: equipment sales and 300mm spend forecasts are early signals of where the next capacity wave is headed. ([Reuters][6])
---
## 한국어
### 1) 거시 전망: “성장 확정”이지만, 수혜는 좁고 집중된다
2026년 전후 반도체 전망은 **AI가 주도하는 로직·메모리 수요**가 중심입니다. WSTS(Autumn 2025) 최신 전망은 **2025년 약 22% 성장(약 7,720억 달러)** 이후 **2026년에 25% 이상 성장해 약 9,750억 달러**로 **1조 달러에 근접**한다고 봅니다. 상향 조정의 핵심 원인은 **Logic·Memory의 강세(AI 수요)**이며, 나머지 품목군은 “완만한 회복” 쪽으로 표현되어 있습니다.
핵심 의미는 다음과 같습니다.
* **수혜는 AI 가치사슬에 집중**: AI 가속기·데이터센터 네트워킹·HBM/DRAM·첨단 패키징·핵심 장비/소재 쪽이 초과수익 구간입니다.
* “반도체 전반이 다 같이 호황”이라기보다 **섹터별 온도차**가 큽니다. WSTS도 자동차 약세가 남아 있는 영역(예: Discretes)을 별도로 언급합니다.
### 2) 수요의 엔진: 데이터센터 AI + 전 산업 ‘AI 내장화’, 그리고 전력/인프라 제약
AI 데이터센터 증설이 수요를 끌어올리지만, 병목은 칩만이 아니라 **전력·인프라·메모리·패키징**까지 확장되었습니다. 2025년 말 기준 다수 보도는 AI가 공급망을 다시 “타이트”하게 만들고 있음을 강조했습니다. ([Reuters][1])
수요 구조는 대체로:
* **훈련(Training)**: 대규모지만 플랫폼/설계 최적화가 빠르게 진행
* **추론(Inference)**: 적용처 확대로 폭발적인 확산, 특히 **메모리 대역폭·용량** 수요를 크게 자극
### 3) 진짜 병목: HBM(메모리) + 첨단 패키징(후공정이 ‘초크 포인트’)
최근 “칩 부족”의 핵심은 전공정 웨이퍼뿐 아니라 **HBM 공급과 첨단 패키징 처리량**입니다.
**HBM/DRAM 타이트**
* Reuters는 **SK hynix가 2026년 물량이 사실상 매진**됐다고 언급했고, 삼성도 다음 해 HBM 고객을 확보했다고 전했습니다. 다만 증설을 하더라도 **의미 있는 신규(특히 범용) 생산능력은 2027–2028년에나 본격화**될 수 있다는 맥락이 함께 제시됩니다. ([Reuters][1])
* Reuters는 Micron이 **2026년 Capex를 200억 달러로 상향**하며 수요 대응에 나섰고, 공급 타이트가 **2027년까지** 이어질 수 있다는 분석도 인용했습니다. ([Reuters][2])
* FT는 HBM 중심의 희소성이 소비자 제품 가격에도 압력을 줄 수 있다는 업계 경고를 보도했습니다. ([Financial Times][3])
**첨단 패키징(CoWoS 등)**
* Reuters는 AI 칩이 고급 패키징을 필수로 요구하며, 패키징 용량이 특정 지역에 집중될 수 있어(예: 신규 전공정 라인과 동행하지 않음) 시스템 출하가 제한될 수 있음을 반복적으로 다뤘습니다. ([Reuters][4])
### 4) 기술 전망: 공정 미세화는 계속되지만, ‘시스템 스케일링’이 더 중요해진다
향후 10년의 성능/전력 개선은 **트랜지스터 + 배선 + 패키징 + 메모리**를 묶은 시스템 최적화에서 더 크게 나옵니다.
주요 포인트:
* **GAA·2nm급 진입**: 업계 보도에 따르면 TSMC는 2nm급(N2) 양산을 **2025년 4분기**에 시작했으며, 후속 개선(파생 노드, backside power 개념 등)을 준비 중으로 언급됩니다. ([Tom's Hardware][5])
* **칩렛/3D 패키징**: 성능은 “칩 하나”가 아니라 **패키지 단위(이종 집적)**에서 좌우되는 비중이 급격히 커집니다.
* **HBM/메모리-온-패키지**: 대역폭, 열, 기판/인터포저, 조립 수율이 경쟁력 핵심이 됩니다.
### 5) 설비투자 전망: 사이클을 “AI 중심으로 재배치”하며 계속 간다
* SEMI는 반도체 제조장비 글로벌 매출이 **2026년 1,260억 달러**, **2027년 1,350억 달러** 수준으로 증가할 것으로 봤고, 동인을 AI용 로직·메모리 투자에서 찾습니다. ([Reuters][6])
* SEMI는 300mm 팹 장비 지출이 **2025년에 1,000억 달러를 돌파**하고 2028년까지 증가하는 흐름을 제시합니다. ([SEMI][7])
* 메모리 장비 지출도 HBM 확대 및 공정 전환으로 2026~2027년까지 증가 전망이 제시됩니다. ([SEMI][8])
### 6) 성숙공정(레거시) 전망: “폭발적 성장”은 아니지만, 산업의 필수 기반
자동차·산업·전력반도체·센서·각종 MCU/아날로그는 여전히 **성숙공정** 중심입니다.
* SEMI 200mm 전망은 2025년 일시 조정 후 2026년 반등을 제시하지만, 장기적으로는 최첨단 AI 투자보다 완만한 궤적입니다. ([SEMI][9])
### 7) 지정학/정책: 분절화는 ‘일시 현상’이 아니라 구조가 됐다
**미국 수출통제**
* BIS는 중국의 첨단 반도체 확보/생산 능력 제한을 위해 2022년 체계 이후 2023–2024년에도 규정을 강화해 왔음을 밝힙니다. ([산업안전청][10])
* 미 의회조사국(CRS)은 2025년 1월 15일 ‘AI Diffusion Rule’ 등을 통해 제3국 경유까지 포함한 라이선스 체계 구상을 설명합니다. ([의회.gov][11])
**중국의 국산화 압력**
* Reuters는 중국이 신규 팹에 **국산 장비 50% 이상**을 요구하는 규칙을 시행하고 있다고 보도했습니다. ([Reuters][12])
**유럽의 현실**
* 유럽감사원(ECA)은 EU Chips Act가 동력을 제공했지만, 현재 투자 수준으로는 2030년 목표 달성이 **매우 어렵다**고 결론 내리며, EU 점유율이 **2030년 11.7% 수준**으로 예측된다고 지적합니다. ([European Court of Auditors][14])
### 8) 전망을 흔들 수 있는 리스크(‘AI 슈퍼사이클’의 약점)
1. **수요 집중**: 초대형 클라우드/AI 플랫폼 소수에 수요가 편중. ([The Wall Street Journal][15])
2. **HBM·패키징 병목**: 전공정 증설만으로 해결되지 않는 구조적 제약. ([Reuters][1])
3. **메모리 사이클**: 타이트가 과잉투자로 급변할 가능성(수요 오판 시). ([Reuters][2])
4. **수출통제/규정 변경**: 라이선스·규정의 변화가 리드타임 자체를 바꿈. ([의회.gov][11])
5. **기술·인력·보안**: 첨단 공정/DRAM 지식 유출은 경쟁력을 단기간에 훼손. ([Reuters][16])
### 9) 실무 팁(추가 응용까지 포함)
* **대체 설계(Design-for-Substitution)**를 기본값으로 두고, 단일 공급 부품(PMIC/MCU/커넥티비티)을 줄여라.
* **메모리를 전략부품으로 관리**하라: 장기 계약·2nd source·가격 민감도(특히 DRAM/HBM)를 BOM 수준에서 상시 모델링하라. ([Reuters][1])
* 최첨단 AI 제품은 **패키징 처리량이 출하량을 결정**할 수 있다(웨이퍼가 있어도 못 나갈 수 있음). ([Reuters][4])
* 공급망이 중국/첨단 연산과 맞물리면 **규정 준수와 라이선스 리드타임**을 납기 계획에 포함하라. ([Reuters][13])
* 장비/300mm 지출 전망은 다음 증설 파동의 선행지표다. ([Reuters][6])
---
## 日本語
### 1) 全体像：成長は強いが、恩恵はAI周辺に集中
WSTSのAutumn 2025予測では、世界半導体市場は**2025年に約22%成長（約7,720億ドル）**、**2026年に25%以上成長して約9,750億ドル**と、1兆ドルに迫る見通しです。上方修正の主因は**LogicとMemory（AI需要）**で、その他は緩やかな回復とされています。
### 2) 主要ボトルネック：HBMと先端パッケージ
* Reutersは、SK hynixの2026年供給が極めてタイトであることや、増産しても新しい生産能力が本格化するのは**2027–2028年**になり得る文脈を報じています。 ([Reuters][1])
* Micronの2026年capex拡大（$20B）と、供給逼迫が2027年まで続く可能性も報じられました。 ([Reuters][2])
* 先端AIチップはCoWoS等の高度パッケージが不可欠で、パッケージ能力が出荷の上限になり得ます。 ([Reuters][4])
### 3) 技術トレンド：微細化＋“システム”最適化
2nm級（GAA等）の進展は重要ですが、今後の差は**チップレット、3D実装、HBM統合、熱設計、歩留まり**など、パッケージ単位の最適化で拡大します。 ([Tom's Hardware][5])
### 4) 地政学：分断は構造化
米国の輸出管理強化（BIS）や、CRSが説明するAI拡散ルールの枠組みは、供給・顧客・投資の意思決定を恒常的に左右します。 ([산업안전청][10])
EUについては欧州会計検査院が2030目標の達成困難性を指摘しています。 ([European Court of Auditors][14])
---
## Español
### 1) Panorama: expansión fuerte, impulsada por IA
WSTS (Autumn 2025) prevé **+22% en 2025 (~US$772B)** y **más de +25% en 2026 (~US$975B)**, acercándose a US$1T. La revisión al alza se atribuye principalmente a **lógica y memoria** por demanda de IA y centros de datos.
### 2) Cuellos de botella: HBM y empaquetado avanzado
Reuters describió un **endurecimiento de la oferta de memoria** ligado a HBM, con expansión de capacidad pero con nuevas plantas relevantes más hacia **2027–2028**; también informó del aumento de capex de Micron para 2026 y expectativas de tensión hasta 2027. ([Reuters][1])
Además, el empaquetado avanzado (p. ej., CoWoS) puede limitar los envíos de sistemas de IA incluso si hay capacidad front-end. ([Reuters][4])
### 3) Geopolítica: controles y reconfiguración industrial
BIS ha reforzado controles para restringir capacidades avanzadas, y CRS describe marcos para limitar la difusión vía terceros países. ([산업안전청][10])
En Europa, el Tribunal de Cuentas de la UE ve improbable alcanzar el objetivo 2030 con el nivel actual de inversión. ([European Court of Auditors][14])
---
## Français
### 1) Vue d’ensemble : croissance élevée, mais concentrée sur l’IA
WSTS (Autumn 2025) anticipe **~+22% en 2025 (≈772 Md$)** et **>+25% en 2026 (≈975 Md$)**, tirés surtout par **Logic et Memory** (IA, data centers), avec une reprise plus graduelle ailleurs.
### 2) Goulots d’étranglement : HBM et packaging avancé
Reuters décrit une tension d’offre sur la mémoire portée par l’HBM, avec des capacités supplémentaires qui prennent du temps à arriver (horizon 2027–2028 pour des volumes significatifs), et l’augmentation des investissements 2026 chez Micron avec une tension pouvant durer jusqu’en 2027. ([Reuters][1])
Le packaging avancé (CoWoS, etc.) devient un facteur limitant de livraisons des systèmes IA. ([Reuters][4])
### 3) Politique industrielle et contrôles : une fragmentation durable
Les contrôles BIS et les cadres décrits par CRS structurent désormais l’allocation de capacité et les routes d’approvisionnement. ([산업안전청][10])
La Cour des comptes européenne juge l’objectif 2030 très difficile à atteindre au vu des investissements actuels. ([European Court of Auditors][14])
---
* [The Wall Street Journal](https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/after-a-year-of-blistering-growth-ai-chip-makers-get-ready-for-bigger-2026-d9f62dbd?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/1f471189-2277-4d5d-822b-78eba6060755?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ai-boom-seen-lifting-chipmaking-equipment-sales-9-126-billion-2026-2025-12-16/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-mandates-50-domestic-equipment-rule-chipmakers-sources-say-2025-12-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/samsung-wins-us-annual-approval-chipmaking-tool-shipments-china-source-says-2025-12-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-charges-10-over-alleged-chip-technology-leak-chinas-cxmt-2025-12-26/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
[1]: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/ai-frenzy-is-driving-new-global-supply-chain-crisis-2025-12-03/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "The AI frenzy is driving a memory chip supply crisis"
[2]: https://www.reuters.com/business/micron-shares-up-12-europe-after-blowout-forecast-2025-12-18/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Micron surges as global memory chip shortage boosts ..."
[3]: https://www.ft.com/content/1f471189-2277-4d5d-822b-78eba6060755?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Chip shortages threaten 20% rise in consumer electronics prices"
[4]: https://www.reuters.com/technology/tsmc-talks-with-nvidia-ai-chip-production-arizona-sources-say-2024-12-05/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "TSMC in talks with Nvidia for AI chip production in Arizona, ..."
[5]: https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/semiconductors/tsmc-begins-quietly-volume-production-of-2nm-class-chips-first-gaa-transistor-for-tsmc-claims-up-to-15-percent-improvement-at-iso-power?utm_source=chatgpt.com "TSMC begins quietly volume production of 2nm-class chips - first GAA transistor for TSMC claims up to 15% improvement at ISO power"
[6]: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ai-boom-seen-lifting-chipmaking-equipment-sales-9-126-billion-2026-2025-12-16/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "AI boom seen lifting chipmaking equipment sales 9% to $126 billion in 2026"
[7]: https://www.semi.org/en/semi-press-release/semi-reports-global-300mm-fab-equipment-spending-expected-to-total-374-billion-dollars-over-next-three-years?utm_source=chatgpt.com "SEMI Reports Global 300mm Fab Equipment Spending ..."
[8]: https://www.semi.org/en/semi-press-release/global-semiconductor-equipment-sales-projected-to-reach-a-record-of-156-billion-dollars-in-2027-semi-reports?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Global Semiconductor Equipment Sales Projected to ..."
[9]: https://www.semi.org/en/products-services/market-data/200mm-fab-outlook?utm_source=chatgpt.com "200mm Fab Outlook Report"
[10]: https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-export-controls-restrict-chinas-capability-produce-advanced-semiconductors-military?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Commerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China's"
[11]: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48642?utm_source=chatgpt.com "U.S. Export Controls and China: Advanced Semiconductors"
[12]: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-mandates-50-domestic-equipment-rule-chipmakers-sources-say-2025-12-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "China mandates 50% domestic equipment rule for chipmakers, sources say"
[13]: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/samsung-wins-us-annual-approval-chipmaking-tool-shipments-china-source-says-2025-12-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "US approves Samsung, SK Hynix chipmaking tool shipments to China for 2026, sources say"
[14]: https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2025-12/SR-2025-12_EN.pdf "Special report 12/2025 - The EU’s strategy for microchips"
[15]: https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/after-a-year-of-blistering-growth-ai-chip-makers-get-ready-for-bigger-2026-d9f62dbd?utm_source=chatgpt.com "After a Year of Blistering Growth, AI Chip Makers Get Ready for Bigger 2026"
[16]: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-charges-10-over-alleged-chip-technology-leak-chinas-cxmt-2025-12-26/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "South Korea charges 10 over alleged chip technology leak to China's CXMT"