## Semiconductor Hegemony by Country ## 국가별 반도체 패권 분석 > Eco-Friendly Solar Energy Tech

## Semiconductor Hegemony by Country

## 국가별 반도체 패권 분석

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## English

### 1) What “semiconductor hegemony” actually means

“Chip hegemony” is not one country “winning chips” in general. It is control over **chokepoints** across the value chain—places where (a) alternatives are scarce, (b) switching costs are huge, and (c) denial or delay changes national power. The modern semiconductor stack is best understood as a set of layers:

* **Architecture/IP & EDA software** (design tools and reusable building blocks)
* **Fabless design** (AI/CPU/GPU/SoC product definition)
* **Foundries** (leading-edge logic manufacturing)
* **Memory** (DRAM/NAND, plus AI-era HBM)
* **Equipment** (lithography, deposition, etch, metrology)
* **Materials** (wafers, photoresists/chemicals, gases)
* **Advanced packaging & OSAT** (2.5D/3D integration, chiplets, test)
* **R&D ecosystems** (pilot lines, standards, talent pipelines)

The European Court of Auditors’ mapping illustrates this “distributed dominance” model: Japan is highlighted as a major silicon-wafer supplier; equipment leadership is split among EU/US/Japan; advanced manufacturing is centered in Taiwan/South Korea/China; and back-end concentration extends into Southeast Asia. ([European Court of Auditors][1])

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### 2) The main power centers (by role)

#### United States: design + toolchain + market leverage

The U.S. remains the **system orchestrator**: it leads in high-value chip design companies, critical design software (EDA), and controls key nodes of the equipment ecosystem and the largest end-market demand. A practical expression of U.S. leverage is **export control policy**—restrictions on advanced computing chips, manufacturing equipment, and (at times) EDA flows to China, updated repeatedly since October 2022. ([Congress.gov][2])
At the industrial-policy level, the CHIPS and Science Act framework is explicitly used to pull capacity onshore via incentives (grants, tax credits, R&D and workforce funding). ([ASML][3])

**Strategic vulnerability:** leading-edge volume manufacturing at scale is still heavily external (notably Taiwan), so “reshoring” is a multi-year risk-management program, not an immediate decoupling.

#### Taiwan: the leading-edge foundry chokepoint

Taiwan’s power is structural: it hosts the world’s most important concentration of leading-edge foundry capacity. TrendForce’s tracking shows TSMC’s foundry share at **67.6% (Q2 2025)**, underscoring just how central Taiwan is to global logic manufacturing. ([TrendForce][4])
This dominance translates into geopolitical “silicon shield” logic: many countries’ economic and security planning assumes Taiwan’s advanced-node continuity.

**Strategic vulnerability:** geographic concentration and cross-strait risk mean the world treats Taiwan’s fabs as critical infrastructure.

#### South Korea: memory superpower + advanced manufacturing contender

Korea’s hegemony is strongest in **memory**—and in the AI era, memory leadership increasingly means **HBM (High Bandwidth Memory)**, where supply tightness can constrain AI system deployment. Counterpoint’s Q2 2025 snapshot highlights Samsung and SK hynix as the core leaders across DRAM/HBM positioning. ([counterpointresearch.com][5])
Korea also competes in advanced logic manufacturing via Samsung Foundry, but its globally unique “moat” is memory scale, yield engineering, and the ability to ramp HBM generations.

**Strategic vulnerability:** exposure to tool/material chokepoints (EDA, advanced lithography, specialty chemicals) and to demand cyclicality.

#### China: scale drive + self-sufficiency under constraint

China’s ambition is to convert its gigantic electronics market into **domestic capability** across the stack. The limiting factor is not only money; it is sustained access to the most advanced tools and know-how under export controls. ([Congress.gov][2])
Reporting has also indicated policy pressure to increase domestic equipment usage in new fabs (e.g., targets around “50% domestic tools” in some buildouts), reflecting a substitution strategy under constraint.

**Strategic vulnerability:** advanced lithography and top-tier EDA/toolchain dependence remain difficult to replace quickly; progress tends to be uneven (fast in mature nodes, slower at the frontier).

#### Japan: materials + equipment depth; rebuilding leading-edge presence

Japan’s hegemony is often misunderstood: it is not primarily about the most advanced logic node today; it is about **indispensable upstream inputs** (materials, wafers, equipment) and manufacturing culture. The ECA report explicitly points to Japan’s outsize role in silicon wafers and to Japan (Tokyo Electron) as a major equipment pillar. ([European Court of Auditors][1])
Tokyo Electron positions itself as a key global supplier (e.g., coater/developer and deposition/etch segments), illustrating why Japan remains hard to bypass even when fabs are elsewhere. ([tel.com][6])
Japan is also attempting a “return to the frontier” via Rapidus’ 2nm program in collaboration frameworks. ([Rapidus株式会社][7])

**Strategic vulnerability:** demographics/talent pipeline and the difficulty of regaining frontier scale after decades of offshoring.

#### Europe (EU): lithography monopoly + specialty manufacturing + R&D hubs

Europe’s single biggest hard chokepoint is **ASML**: EUV lithography is widely recognized as a critical technology with ASML as the only supplier. ([ASML][8])
Europe also has strong specialty IDMs (auto/industrial, power semis), and high-leverage research hubs—imec presents itself as the world’s leading independent nanoelectronics R&D hub, shaping next-node process roadmaps. ([imec][9])
However, Europe’s strategic challenge is scale in leading-edge manufacturing. The European Court of Auditors assessed that the EU is **very unlikely** to meet its 2030 “20% share” target, projecting **11.7%** instead. ([European Court of Auditors][1])

**Strategic vulnerability:** fragmented funding/mandates and slower project execution relative to the U.S. and Asia.

#### United Kingdom (and partners): architecture/IP leverage

The UK’s “hegemony layer” is compute architecture IP—Arm states that **more than 99% of smartphones** are built on Arm. ([arm.com][10])
This is a different kind of power: it is ecosystem standard-setting, software compatibility, and licensing leverage rather than wafer output.

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### 3) The “hidden battlefield”: EDA and advanced packaging

Two domains are increasingly decisive:

**EDA (design software):** A small number of vendors dominate. TrendForce figures cited in reporting put Synopsys, Cadence, and Siemens EDA at **31%, 30%, and 13% (2024)** shares—making tools a strategic lever. ([Silicon UK][11])

**Advanced packaging & OSAT:** AI performance scaling now depends on packaging (chiplets, 2.5D/3D, HBM stacks). Southeast Asia is central here; Reuters notes Malaysia accounts for **about 13% of global semiconductor testing and packaging**. ([Reuters][12])

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### 4) Outlook: where hegemony is moving (next 5–10 years)

1. **AI supply chains shift power toward memory + packaging** (HBM and 2.5D/3D become bottlenecks). ([counterpointresearch.com][5])
2. **Lithography remains the “hardest” chokepoint**; EUV (and High-NA transitions) keep ASML central. ([ASML][8])
3. **Export controls keep shaping industrial geography**—creating incentives for onshore capacity in the U.S./EU and substitution drives in China. ([Congress.gov][2])
4. **Europe’s challenge is execution speed and scale**, not lack of competence; auditors’ 11.7% projection is a warning sign about realism. ([European Court of Auditors][1])

**Note on sources:** A PDF screenshot extraction was attempted for the ECA report, but the tool returned a validation error; citations above reference the PDF text extracted via the web reader. ([European Court of Auditors][1])

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## 한국어

### 1) “반도체 패권”의 본질

반도체 패권은 “한 나라가 반도체를 다 만든다”가 아니라, 공급망의 **병목(Chokepoint)**—대체가 어렵고 전환비용이 큰 지점을 누가 쥐고 있느냐의 문제입니다. 가치사슬을 층으로 나누면 다음이 핵심 레이어입니다:

* **설계(IP)·EDA(설계자동화 소프트웨어)**
* **팹리스(제품 정의·아키텍처·AI/CPU/GPU)**
* **파운드리(첨단 로직 생산)**
* **메모리(DRAM/NAND, 그리고 AI 시대 HBM)**
* **장비(노광·증착·식각·계측)**
* **소재(웨이퍼·포토레지스트·가스)**
* **첨단 패키징/OSAT(2.5D/3D, 칩렛, 테스트)**
* **R&D 생태계(파일럿 라인·표준·인력)**

EU 감사원(ECA) 보고서는 이 “분산 지배” 구조를 한 장에 요약합니다. 일본(웨이퍼), EU/미국/일본(장비), 대만/한국/중국(첨단 제조), 동남아(후공정)처럼 각 레이어의 강자가 다릅니다. ([European Court of Auditors][1])

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### 2) 국가/지역별 패권 포지션(핵심 플레이어 중심)

#### 미국: 설계·툴체인·시장/제재 레버리지

미국은 **시스템 총괄자**에 가깝습니다. 고부가가치 설계(팹리스), 핵심 설계 툴(EDA), 장비 생태계 일부, 그리고 최대 수요시장까지 겹치면서 “룰을 만들 수 있는 힘”이 큽니다. 이 힘이 현실에서 드러나는 방식이 **수출통제(advanced computing·장비·EDA 등)**이며 2022년 10월 이후 여러 차례 업데이트되어 왔습니다. ([Congress.gov][2])
또한 CHIPS 정책은 보조금·세액공제·R&D/인력 투자를 통해 생산거점을 끌어오는 산업정책의 축으로 작동합니다. ([ASML][3])

#### 대만: 첨단 파운드리의 세계적 병목

대만의 힘은 구조적입니다. 첨단 로직 생산의 핵심이 대만에 집중되어 있기 때문입니다. TrendForce 기준 TSMC 파운드리 점유율은 **2025년 2분기 67.6%**로 추정됩니다. ([TrendForce][4])

#### 한국: 메모리(특히 HBM) 초강국 + 첨단 제조 경쟁자

한국의 가장 두꺼운 해자는 **메모리**입니다. AI 시대에는 “메모리 패권 = HBM 패권” 성격이 강해져, HBM 수급이 AI 서버/가속기 확장 속도를 좌우하는 병목이 됩니다. Counterpoint의 2025년 2분기 자료는 삼성전자·SK hynix가 DRAM/HBM 축에서 핵심 리더임을 보여줍니다. ([counterpointresearch.com][5])

#### 중국: ‘규모→자립’ 전환을 수출통제 하에서 추진

중국은 거대한 내수(전자·통신·산업) 기반을 **국산 생태계**로 바꾸려는 국가전략을 강하게 추진합니다. 다만 최첨단 영역에서는 수출통제(첨단칩·장비·EDA)가 경로를 크게 좌우합니다. ([Congress.gov][2])
또한 일부 신규 팹에서 **국산 장비 사용 비중(예: 50% 수준 목표)**을 높이려는 정책 압력이 보도된 바 있어, “대체·내재화”가 핵심 전술임을 시사합니다.

#### 일본: 소재·장비의 ‘우회 불가능한’ 깊이 + 프론티어 복귀 시도

일본은 첨단 로직 생산량보다 **상류(소재·웨이퍼·장비)**에서 우회가 어렵다는 점이 패권 포인트입니다. ECA 보고서는 일본을 실리콘 웨이퍼 공급의 핵심 축으로, 장비에서는 일본(도쿄일렉트론)을 주요 축으로 명시합니다. ([European Court of Auditors][1])
도쿄일렉트론은 글로벌 핵심 공정장비 공급자로서의 위상을 강조하고 있습니다. ([tel.com][6])
또한 Rapidus의 2nm 프로젝트 등 “첨단 복귀” 시도도 진행 중입니다. ([Rapidus株式会社][7])

#### 유럽(EU): EUV 노광 ‘독점’ + 특화 IDM + R&D 허브(imec)

유럽의 가장 강력한 병목은 **ASML의 EUV 노광**입니다(사실상 유일 공급자). ([ASML][8])
또한 imec 같은 연구허브는 차세대 공정 로드맵에 큰 영향력을 가집니다. ([imec][9])
반면, 유럽은 첨단 제조 “규모”가 약점입니다. ECA는 2030년 EU 20% 목표 달성이 **매우 어렵고**, **11.7%** 수준으로 전망했습니다. ([European Court of Auditors][1])

#### 영국(및 파트너): 아키텍처/IP 레버리지

영국의 핵심 레이어는 Arm 중심의 **아키텍처 IP**입니다. Arm은 전 세계 스마트폰의 **99% 이상이 Arm 기반**이라고 밝힙니다. ([arm.com][10])

---

### 3) 숨은 전장: EDA와 첨단 패키징

* **EDA:** 소수 기업 지배가 강해 전략 레버리지가 됩니다(보도 인용 TrendForce 수치: 2024년 Synopsys 31%, Cadence 30%, Siemens EDA 13%). ([Silicon UK][11])
* **첨단 패키징/OSAT:** AI 성능 확장은 패키징(칩렛·2.5D/3D·HBM 스택)에 더 의존합니다. 말레이시아는 전 세계 반도체 테스트·패키징의 **약 13%**를 차지한다는 Reuters 보도가 있습니다. ([Reuters][12])

---

### 4) 향후 전망(5~10년)

1. **AI가 ‘메모리+패키징’의 패권 가중치**를 끌어올립니다(HBM·2.5D/3D가 병목). ([counterpointresearch.com][5])
2. **노광(EUV)은 계속 최상위 병목**으로 남습니다. ([ASML][8])
3. **수출통제는 공급망 지리 재편을 계속 압박**합니다(미국/유럽의 온쇼어링 vs 중국의 대체·내재화). ([Congress.gov][2])
4. **유럽은 역량 부족이 아니라 ‘속도·집행·규모’가 관건**이며, 11.7% 전망은 현실 점검 신호입니다. ([European Court of Auditors][1])

(참고: ECA PDF 페이지를 스크린샷으로 호출하려 했으나 도구 오류(ValidationError)가 발생하여, 웹 리더의 PDF 텍스트 추출 기반으로 인용했습니다.) ([European Court of Auditors][1])

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## 日本語

### 1)「半導体覇権」の正体

覇権とは生産量の多寡ではなく、代替が難しい**ボトルネック（chokepoint）**を誰が握るかです。層で見ると、EDA/IP、ファブレス設計、先端ファウンドリ、メモリ（HBM）、装置、材料、先端パッケージング（2.5D/3D）、R&D基盤に分かれます。ECAはこの「分散的な優位」を示し、日本＝シリコンウェハ、EU/米/日＝装置、台湾/韓国/中国＝先端製造、東南アジア＝後工程という構図を整理しています。 ([European Court of Auditors][1])

### 2) 主役の国・地域（役割別）

* **米国**：設計（ファブレス）・EDA・需要市場を中心に“ルール形成力”。輸出規制（先端計算、装置、EDA等）が戦略レバーとして機能。 ([Congress.gov][2])
* **台湾**：先端ロジック製造の核心。TSMCのファウンドリシェアはQ2 2025で**67.6%**。 ([TrendForce][4])
* **韓国**：メモリ超大国。AI時代はHBMが制約要因になりやすく、主要プレイヤーの存在感が大きい。 ([counterpointresearch.com][5])
* **中国**：巨大市場を背景に自給率を引き上げるが、輸出規制がフロンティア領域を強く制約。国内装置比率を高める政策圧力（例：50%目標）も報道。 ([Congress.gov][2])
* **日本**：材料・装置の“迂回困難”な層が強み。ECAは日本のウェハ供給やTokyo Electronを装置の柱として言及。 ([European Court of Auditors][1])
* **欧州（EU）**：ASMLのEUVが最大のチョークポイント。 ([ASML][8])  imecなどR&D拠点も強い。 ([imec][9])  一方、ECAは2030年の20%目標は困難で**11.7%**見通し。 ([European Court of Auditors][1])
* **英国**：ArmのアーキテクチャIP。スマホの**99%以上**がArmベースという説明は、標準化・互換性の覇権を示します。 ([arm.com][10])

### 3) 重要度が急上昇した領域

* **EDA**：寡占度が高く、報道引用のTrendForce推計ではSynopsys 31%、Cadence 30%、Siemens EDA 13%（2024）。 ([Silicon UK][11])
* **先端パッケージング**：HBM/チップレット時代の決戦場。マレーシアはテスト・パッケージで世界の**約13%**と報道。 ([Reuters][12])

### 4) 今後5〜10年の見取り図

AI拡大で「メモリ＋パッケージ」の重みが増し、EUVは引き続き最上位のボトルネック。輸出規制が立地再編（米EUのオンショア、中国の代替化）を押し続けます。 ([counterpointresearch.com][5])

---

## Español

### 1) Qué significa “hegemonía” en semiconductores

No es “quién fabrica más chips”, sino quién controla **cuellos de botella**: herramientas EDA, litografía, equipos críticos, materiales, capacidad de foundry avanzada, memoria (HBM) y packaging 2.5D/3D. El propio mapeo del ECA resume esta dominancia distribuida: Japón fuerte en obleas, UE/EE. UU./Japón en equipos, Taiwán/Corea/China en fabricación avanzada y el Sudeste Asiático en back-end. ([European Court of Auditors][1])

### 2) Centros de poder por función

* **Estados Unidos**: liderazgo en diseño y software (EDA) y gran poder regulatorio vía controles de exportación sobre computación avanzada/equipos/EDA (desde 2022 con múltiples ajustes). ([Congress.gov][2])  Además, usa incentivos industriales (CHIPS) para atraer capacidad doméstica. ([ASML][3])
* **Taiwán**: cuello de botella del “leading-edge foundry”. TSMC alcanza **67,6%** de cuota foundry (T2 2025). ([TrendForce][4])
* **Corea del Sur**: superpotencia de memoria; en la era de IA, HBM puede limitar despliegues. ([counterpointresearch.com][5])
* **China**: empuje de autosuficiencia condicionado por controles de exportación; presión por elevar el uso de equipos domésticos (p. ej., objetivos del 50%) ha sido reportada. ([Congress.gov][2])
* **Japón**: fortaleza upstream (materiales/equipos). ECA menciona a Japón como actor clave en obleas y a Tokyo Electron como pilar de equipos. ([European Court of Auditors][1])
* **Europa (UE)**: el gran chokepoint es **EUV** con ASML como proveedor crítico. ([ASML][8])  En I+D, imec es un hub de referencia. ([imec][9])  Pero ECA proyecta que la UE quedaría en **11,7%** para 2030 y que el objetivo del 20% es muy improbable. ([European Court of Auditors][1])
* **Reino Unido**: poder por IP/arquitectura (Arm) —más del **99%** de smartphones sobre Arm. ([arm.com][10])

### 3) La batalla silenciosa: EDA y packaging

* **EDA**: alta concentración; cifras citadas (TrendForce) sitúan 31%/30%/13% para Synopsys/Cadence/Siemens EDA en 2024. ([Silicon UK][11])
* **Packaging/OSAT**: Reuters atribuye a Malasia alrededor del **13%** del testing y packaging global. ([Reuters][12])

### 4) Tendencias (5–10 años)

IA desplaza hegemonía hacia HBM + packaging; EUV sigue como el cuello de botella “más duro”; y la geopolítica (controles) sigue reconfigurando inversiones y localización industrial. ([counterpointresearch.com][5])

---

## Français

### 1) Ce que recouvre la « domination » des semi-conducteurs

La « puissance » ne se résume pas au volume produit : elle se situe dans les **goulots d’étranglement** (EDA, lithographie, équipements, matériaux, foundry avancée, mémoire HBM, packaging 2.5D/3D). Le schéma du rapport ECA illustre cette domination distribuée (Japon—wafers, UE/USA/Japon—équipements, Taïwan/Corée/Chine—fabrication, Asie du Sud-Est—back-end). ([European Court of Auditors][1])

### 2) Les pôles majeurs par rôle

* **États-Unis** : leadership design/logiciels (EDA) + levier réglementaire via contrôles à l’export sur calcul avancé/équipements/EDA depuis 2022 (plusieurs mises à jour). ([Congress.gov][2])  Politique industrielle (CHIPS) pour relocaliser capacité et sécuriser la chaîne. ([ASML][3])
* **Taïwan** : goulot d’étranglement du « leading-edge foundry » ; TSMC à **67,6%** (T2 2025). ([TrendForce][4])
* **Corée du Sud** : puissance mémoire ; l’IA rend la HBM déterminante. ([counterpointresearch.com][5])
* **Chine** : montée en puissance sous contraintes de contrôles ; stratégies de substitution (ex. pression pour augmenter la part d’équipements domestiques, cible 50% rapportée). ([Congress.gov][2])
* **Japon** : profondeur amont (matériaux/équipements) ; l’ECA cite le Japon pour les wafers et Tokyo Electron côté équipements. ([European Court of Auditors][1])
* **Europe (UE)** : le grand chokepoint est l’EUV avec ASML (fournisseur critique). ([ASML][8])  En R&D, imec est un hub majeur. ([imec][9])  Mais l’ECA juge l’objectif 2030 (20%) très improbable et projette **11,7%**. ([European Court of Auditors][1])
* **Royaume-Uni** : levier IP/architecture (Arm) — **plus de 99%** des smartphones sur Arm. ([arm.com][10])

### 3) Deux terrains décisifs : EDA et packaging

* **EDA** : oligopole ; chiffres cités (TrendForce) ~31%/30%/13% (Synopsys/Cadence/Siemens EDA, 2024). ([Silicon UK][11])
* **Packaging/OSAT** : Reuters attribue à la Malaisie **≈13%** du test & packaging mondial. ([Reuters][12])

### 4) Projection (5–10 ans)

L’IA renforce la centralité « mémoire + packaging » ; l’EUV reste le goulot le plus dur ; et les contrôles à l’export continuent de remodeler la géographie industrielle. ([counterpointresearch.com][5])

[1]: https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2025-12/SR-2025-12_EN.pdf "Special report 12/2025 - The EU’s strategy for microchips"
[2]: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48642 "U.S. Export Controls and China: Advanced Semiconductors | Congress.gov | Library of Congress"
[3]: https://www.asml.com/products/euv-lithography-systems?utm_source=chatgpt.com "EUV lithography systems – Products"
[4]: https://www.trendforce.com/presscenter/news/20250901-12691.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com "2Q25 Foundry Revenue Surges 14.6% to Record High ..."
[5]: https://counterpointresearch.com/en/insights/global-dram-and-hbm-market-share?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Global DRAM and HBM Market Share: Quarterly"
[6]: https://www.tel.com/corporatesummary/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Corporate Summary"
[7]: https://www.rapidus.inc/en/news_topics/information/nedo-fy2025-approval/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "NEDO Approves Rapidus' FY2025 Plan and Budget for ..."
[8]: https://www.asml.com/news/stories/2022/busting-asml-myths?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Busting ASML myths – Stories"
[9]: https://www.imec-int.com/en?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Imec R&D, nano electronics and digital technologies"
[10]: https://www.arm.com/markets/mobile-computing?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Mobile Computing"
[11]: https://www.silicon.co.uk/e-regulation/china-chip-design-620616?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Synopsys, Cadence Shares Surge After EDA Controls Lifted"
[12]: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysia-pm-says-targeting-over-100-bln-investment-semiconductor-chips-2024-05-28/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Malaysia targets over $100 bln in semiconductor industry investment"